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The Roman Division of Wrongs: A New 
Hypothesis 
Eric Descheemaeker* 
Abstract — This article examines the rationale of the Justinianic 
division of wrongs into delicts and “quasi-delicts.”  Taking as its 
starting point the assumption that the distinction corresponded to 
that between fault- (culpa-) based and situational liability, it hy-
pothesizes that the quasi-delictal appendix arose after the time of 
Gaius’ Institutes from a contraction of the Roman concept of a civil 
wrong (delictum): its scope would have narrowed from an unlaw-
ful liability-creating act to a blameworthy such act, thereby re-
jecting, outside of the delictal class proper, instances of liability 
regardless of fault. 
 
Introduction 
One important feature of post-classical Roman law, as reflected in 
Justinian’s Institutes, is that it divided what we would call today 
its law of civil wrongs into two groups: some obligations from 
unlawful, non-criminal events were said to arise ex delicto (“from 
a delict”), while others were deemed to arise quasi ex delicto (“as if 
from a delict”).  The dividing line between delicts and “quasi-
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delicts”1 has been the subject of a wealth of scholarly literature.  I 
have argued elsewhere2 that the dichotomy corresponded to the 
divide between fault-based and situational liability,3 and the 
discussion will not be reopened in the present article.  This hy-
pothesis will be taken as a starting point. 
  What has not, on the other hand, been the object of much 
attention on the part of Romanists is the rationale of the division: 
why was such a distinction made between wrongs proper and 
“quasi-wrongs”?  Because some modern jurisdictions like Scotland 
and France have retained a similar division (even if it is devoid of 
practical signiﬁcance), we might not regard the twofoldness of the 
Roman law of wrongs as immediately problematic; yet historical 
longevity provides no explanation for its having come into exis-
tence in the ﬁrst place.  That the Roman division needs to be ac-
counted for is all the truer because it did not always exist.  In 
Gaius’ Institutes (written ca. AD 135),4 only one class of wrongs is 
being mentioned; and the existence of a second category, or an 
appendix, is not even suggested.  Thus, from a historical perspec-
tive, the above question can be rephrased differently: why did 
Roman law decide, at some stage of its historical development, to 
split its law of wrongs into two? 
                                                                                               
1  The term is in inverted commas because it was not used until after 
Justinian’s codiﬁcation.  The ﬁrst occurrence of the term “quasi delicton” 
(and, in parallel, of “quasi contracton,” both in Hellenized Latin) is to be 
found in Theophilus’ Greek paraphrase of the Institutes (see E. C. Ferrini, 
ed., Institutionum Graeca Paraphrasis Theophilo Antecessori, 2 (Berlin 
1967), §§ 3.27.3, 5; 4.5 pr.).  The Basilica would then speak in the ninth 
century of ὡσανεὶ  ἁµάρτηµα (literally, “quasi-delict”) in the Greek text, a 
term later rendered in the Latin version as “quasi delictum” (K. W. E. 
Heimbach,  Basilicorum libri LX, 5 (Leipzig 1850), 327).  While it is 
convenient to call “quasi-delicts” the events from which obligations quasi ex 
delicto arise, it conceals the fact that the Romans never gave a name to 
this class of causative events.  It also confuses quasi as a conjunction 
(meaning “as if”) and quasi as an adverb (“almost”). 
2 E.  Descheemaeker,  The Division of Wrongs: A Historical Compara-
tive Study (Oxford 2009), 67, 69–99. 
3  The term “situational liability” is used to describe liability arising 
from the occurrence of a particular factual situation.  While it is generally 
synonymous with the more widely used “no-fault” and “strict liability,” it 
is a better phrase because it emphasize s  t h e f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s i m p l y  
liability without fault or even liability regardless of fault, but liability 
imposed without the question of fault coming into the picture in the ﬁrst 
place: subject to possible justiﬁcations (themselves unrelated to fault), 
liability arises immediately from the occurrence of a particular factual 
situation. 
4  The date is based on Professor Honoré’s reconstructed chronology 
of Gaius’ works: see A. M. Honoré, Gaius (Oxford 1962), 69. 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  3
 
  The answer necessarily belongs to what can be described as 
the “classiﬁcatory stream” of Roman law.  The actional system 
around which Roman law grew did not think in terms of actions ex 
delicto or quasi ex delicto, and neither did the bulk of legal litera-
ture which followed the edictal order.  Such a classiﬁcation of ac-
tions (and of the corresponding obligations) belongs essentially to 
Gaius and Justinian.  If the rationale of the Roman division of 
wrongs (or, which comes to the same, of the appearance of the 
quasi-delictal appendix) can be found at all, it will have to be in 
the transition from Gaius’ single class of wrongs to Justinian’s 
twofold structure.  This is what this article will focus upon. 
 In  the  ﬁrst two sections, I shall lay out the relevant texts and 
analyse the shortcomings of their traditional interpretation in 
terms of the addition of new classes of causative events.  In the 
third section an alternative explanation will be defended, which 
ﬁnds the origin of the appendix in the contraction of the original 
class, a contraction that was brought about by the narrowing 
down of the concept of a wrong (delictum) over the classical pe-
riod. 
I.  The Structural Framework 
The starting point of this paper was the distinction drawn in 
Justinian’s  Institutes between wrongs and “quasi-wrongs,” or 
more accurately between obligations ex delicto and quasi ex 
delicto.5  The scope of the enquiry must immediately be widened 
because this division features in the context of a larger, fourfold 
classiﬁcation of the events from which obligations arise: 
J.3.13.2.  Aut enim ex contractu sunt aut quasi ex contractu 
aut ex maleﬁcio aut quasi ex maleﬁcio. 
                                                                                               
5  A difficult issue of translation arises here: should “delictum” be 
straightforwardly anglicized into “delict,” or can it legitimately be trans-
lated by the English word “wrong”?  Logically, the answer depends on 
what is meant by “wrong”; in particular, if the deﬁnition of wrong is cast 
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is that the deﬁnition of a wrong is not stable or univocal, neither from a 
jurisprudential nor from a historical perspective.  As this paper will 
attempt to show, the scope of the concept evolved even in the course of the 
development of Roman law.  This makes it all but impossible to ﬁnd an 
analytically satisfactory translation.  The present article will simply use 
“delict” and “wrong” as alternative, both imperfect, renderings for “delic-
tum.” 4  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 5
 
[Obligations] arise from a contract, as though from a contract, 
from a wrong, or as though from a wrong.  (Trans. Birks and 
McLeod.) 
For the present purposes, two assumptions (neither of which is 
controversial) will be made in respect of this classiﬁcation.  The 
ﬁrst one is that the distinction between, on the one hand, obliga-
tions ex contractu and quasi ex contractu and, on the other hand, 
obligations ex delicto and quasi ex delicto is that the former arise 
from lawful causative events while the latter arise from unlawful 
such events.  The second assumption is that, within lawful events, 
the line between contract and “quasi-contract” corresponds to the 
presence or absence of conventio, i.e. an agreement of the minds of 
the parties. 
  If these, and the basis for the division between delicts and 
“quasi-delicts” which was taken as a working hypothesis, are cor-
rect, the substance of Justinian’s fourfold classiﬁcation can then 
be summarized as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 1 ― The Quadripartition of Obligations 
in Justinian’s Institutes 
 
Justinian’s position was the end point of the development of Ro-
man law (in its ﬁrst life).  In terms of the classiﬁcation of obliga-
tions, within which the division of wrongs arose, the starting 
point was Gaius’ Institutes, of which Justinian’s were essentially a 
new edition almost four centuries later.  Although the structure of 
both books, known as the institutional scheme, is (apart from 
some low-level adjustments) the same, a signiﬁcant variation can 
be found when it comes to the classiﬁcation of causative events.  
For Gaius, the number of categories of events from which obliga-
tions arose was only two: 
G.3.88.  Nunc transeamus ad obligationes, quarum summa 
divisio in duas species diducitur: omnis enim obligatio vel ex 
contractu nascitur vel ex delicto. 
ex contractu  ex delicto 
quasi ex contractu  quasi ex delicto 
conventio 
no con–
ventio 
culpa (lato 
sensu) 
no culpa 
lawful events  unlawful events 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  5
 
We turn to obligations.  They divide ﬁrst into two: all obliga-
tions arise from a contract or from a wrong.  (Trans. Gordon 
and Robinson, revised.) 
However, this passage is followed almost immediately by another 
which appears to show that Gaius might have doubted or even 
denied this proposition: 
G.3.91.  Is quoque, qui non debitum accepit ab eo, qui per er-
rorem solvit, re obligatur; nam proinde ei condici potest SI 
PARET EUM DARE OPORTERE, ac si mutuum accepisset. . . .  Sed 
haec species obligationis non videtur ex contractu consistere, 
quia is, qui solvendi animo dat, magis distrahere vult nego-
tium quam contrahere. 
A person also incurs an obligation by conduct if he receives 
something not due to him from a person who pays him by 
mistake.  This recipient is just as much caught by the words 
of that action — “if it appears that he has a duty to give” — as 
if he had been given a loan. . . .  But here the obligation can-
not be said to arise from contract.  Someone who gives in-
tending to discharge a debt means, not to tie up a deal, but to 
untie one, “distrahere” not “contrahere.”  (Trans. Gordon and 
Robinson.) 
Thus Gaius acknowledged, at least on the face of it, two classes of 
causative events and Justinian four; Justinian had a division of 
wrongs while Gaius did not.  In other words, the Roman division 
of wrongs arose in the passage from G.3.88 to J.3.13.2.  It is this 
transition that needs to be examined if we want to understand the 
rationale of Justinian’s dichotomy. 
  In the whole surviving literature, there is only one text be-
sides these two which deals with the question of the classiﬁcation 
of obligations.6  It is a fragment of Gaius’ Res cottidianae, which 
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D.5.1.57 (Ulpian 41 Sab.), D.14.5.4.2 (Ulpian 29 ed.).  As far as the “quasi-
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Gaius and Justinian.  The expression quasi ex delicto venerit liberti ap-
pears in a fragment of the formula Fabiana attributed to Paul; but Girard 
must be right that its use is fortuitous (P. Girard, Textes de droit romain, 
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were possibly a posthumous edition of his Institutes and are only 
known through extracts in the Digest.  The passage is particularly 
important because it provides the basis for these bits in Justin-
ian’s  Institutes which were not lifted from Gaius’ eponymous 
work.  The text starts by resorting to a threefold classiﬁcation of 
causative events:7 
D.44.7.1 pr. (Gaius 2 rerum cottidianarum).  Obligationes aut 
ex contractu nascuntur aut ex maleﬁcio aut proprio quodam 
iure ex variis causarum ﬁguris. 
Obligations arise either from a contract or from a wrong or by 
operation of law: the latter can take various forms. 
It then continues in a manner which appears to be intended to 
break the residual miscellany in two groups: 
D.44.7.5 pr.–6 (Gaius 3 rerum cottidianarum).  Si quis absen-
tis negotia gesserit . . . si vero sine mandatu . . . placuit 
quidem sane eos invicem obligari. . . .  Sed neque ex contractu 
neque ex maleﬁcio actiones nascuntur. . . .  1.  Tutelae quoque 
iudicio qui tenentur, non proprie ex contractu obligati in-
telleguntur . . . sed quia sane non ex maleﬁcio tenentur, quasi 
ex contractu teneri videntur. . . .  2.  Heres quoque, qui lega-
tum debet, neque ex contractu neque ex maleﬁcio obligatus 
esse intellegitur. . . .  3.  Is quoque, qui non debitum accipit 
per errorem solventis, obligatur quidem quasi ex mutui da-
tione . . . sed non potest intellegi is, qui ex ea causa tenetur, 
ex contractu obligatus esse. . . .  4.  Si iudex litem suam fe-
cerit, non proprie ex maleﬁcio obligatus videtur, sed quia ne-
que ex contractu obligatus est utique peccasse aliquid intelle-
gitur, licet per imprudentiam, ideo videtur quasi ex maleﬁcio 
t e n e r i .   5 .   I s  q u o q u e ,  e x  c u ius cenaculo . . . deiectum ef-
fusumve aliquid est ita . . . quasi ex maleﬁcio teneri videtur. . 
. .  Cui similis est is, qui ea parte, qua volgo iter ﬁeri solet, id 
positum aut suspensum habet, quod potest, si ceciderit, alicui 
nocere. . . .  6.  Item exercitor navis aut cauponae aut stabuli 
de damno aut furto, quod in nave aut caupona aut stabulo 
factum sit, quasi ex maleﬁcio teneri videtur . . . . 
If someone has administered the affairs of an absent person . 
. . if the administration was without a mandate . . . it was 
clearly accepted indeed that they are bound to each other. . . .  
However, the actions arise neither from contract, nor from a 
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wrong. . . .  1.  Also persons who are liable in an action on tu-
telage are not considered, properly speaking, to be bound by 
contract . . . but because they are not liable in wrong, they are 
regarded to be liable as though from a contract. . . .  2.  Also 
an heir who owes a legacy is considered to be bound neither 
in contract nor in wrong. . . .  3.  Also he who received what is 
not due from one who pays it in error . . . is bound as though a 
loan has been given . . . but he who is liable on that ground 
cannot be considered to be liable on contract. . . .  4.  If a judge 
has made a cause his own, he does not, properly speaking, 
seem to be liable in wrong, but because he was not bound in 
contract either, yet surely is considered to have done wrong in 
some way, albeit through ignorance . . . he is regarded as li-
able as if from a wrong.  5.  Also a person from whose upper 
floor . . . something has been thrown or poured down . . . is 
regarded as liable as if from a wrong. . . .  Similar to such a 
person is one who keeps something placed or suspended in a 
place where it is general for the public to pass through, which 
can, if it fell down, cause harm to another. . . .  6.  Likewise, 
the man who runs a ship or an inn or a stable is regarded as 
being liable as if from a wrong for damage or theft which has 
been committed on the ship or in the inn or stable.  (Trans. 
Watson Digest, revised.) 
Later, Justinian’s Institutes repeated almost verbatim, but in two 
separate titles (J.3.27 and J.4.5), all that the Res cottidianae had 
said of obligations quasi ex contractu and quasi ex delicto. 
  The question for us is that of the interpretation of this evolu-
tion.  Why did Roman law know two classes of obligations at one 
point of its history, then three and then four?  To put the same 
question from a different perspective, why was a class of obliga-
tions said to be quasi ex delicto carved out alongside the existing 
category of obligations ex delicto?  Since a symmetrical process 
happened roughly at the same time on the side of lawful causative 
events, with obligations quasi ex contractu being added to those ex 
contractu, it is reasonable to assume that the two might be linked, 
and therefore helpful to examine them together. 
  The dominant interpretation has been that the process was 
one of extension, new categories being added to the existing ones 
to accommodate events which had not previously been provided 
for.  The view argued for in this paper is that in fact the opposite 
process occurred: Gaius’ original dichotomy was exhaustive; the 
quasi-categories (and indirectly the division of wrongs) did not 
arise from the addition of new classes but the rejection of some 8  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 5
 
events from the original categories, following the contraction of 
their scope.  This narrowing down of the original classes occurred 
on both sides of the divide between lawful and unlawful causative 
events, and took the form of the “essentialization” of an element of 
each class, which previously would have been regarded as typical 
but not essential.  These, it is submitted, were conventio on the 
side of contracts and fault (culpa in the wider sense)8 on the side 
of delicts. 
  The following two sections set out the opposing views and 
articulate the case for the alternative proposition.  On the side of 
delicts, the evidence is circumstantial only; but that does not in 
my mind stop the argument from being a cogent one. 
II.  The Traditional Explanation: Addition 
A.  Description 
The traditional explanation of Romanists proceeds by gradual 
expansion.  It can be summarized as follows.  In G.3.88, Gaius 
stated that there existed two causes of obligations, contract and 
delict.  But immediately after, in G.3.91, he realized that this was 
not the end of the story; there remained obligations which could 
not be ﬁtted in either pigeonhole and lay beyond them.  The obli-
gation to repay a mistaken payment, which he mentions at that 
point, was one of them: it did not arise from a contract because 
there was no deal between the parties, nor obviously did it arise 
from a wrong: it had to arise from something else.  When he came 
back to the question in the Res cottidianae, Gaius made allowance 
for the incompleteness of his original dichotomy and added a 
third, residuary category of causative events, the variae causarum 
ﬁgurae: all obligations now arose either from contract or from 
delict or from “various species of causes,” a negatively deﬁned 
residual class containing all obligations which were neither ex 
contractu nor ex delicto.  Then, in an attempt to resolve the mis-
cellany, Gaius linked up the variae causarum ﬁgurae, on an ana-
logical basis, with either contract or delict.9 
                                                                                               
8  That is to say, either intentional fault (dolus malus) or uninten-
tional fault (culpa in the narrower sense, which we might want to trans-
late in English — albeit imperfectly — as “negligence”). 
9 H.  Vizioz,  La notion de quasi-contrat. Etude historique et critique 
(Bordeaux 1912), 54–55; E. Betti, “Sul signiﬁcato di ‘contrahere’ in Gaio e 
sulla non-classicità della denominazione ‘quasi ex contractu obligatio’,” 
BIDR, 25 (1913), 65, 87 (stating that Gaius expressed the common wisdom 
of his time in G.3.88 but gives us his “real opinion” in the Res cottidianae); 
id., “Le fonti d’obbligazione e i problemi storici della loro classiﬁcazione,” 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  9
 
B.  Difficulties 
This theory looks appealing, not least because it is simple and 
follows the texts closely and in chronological order.  There were 
two then three then four classes of obligations, and therefore the 
third was added to the ﬁrst two and then divided up to make four.  
Nevertheless, it is unconvincing for several reasons. 
i.  The Problem of the Summa Divisio 
A principal stumbling block for the above theory is the language 
of G.3.88, in which Gaius speaks of a “summa divisio” of obliga-
tions.  Summa divisio (literally, the “highest division”) was a term 
of art whose content was extremely strong.  In Latin rhetoric, as 
codiﬁed by Cicero (who followed Aristotle’s Rhetoric on this point), 
divisio entailed exhaustiveness and exclusivity:10 a divisio divides 
a class into subclasses, in such a way that every element of the 
larger set belongs to one and only one of the smaller sets. 
  Of course, it is possible that a writer might use the term slop-
pily; but the adjunction of “summa” renders this hypothesis highly 
implausible, especially on the part of a man for whom taxonomical 
considerations were at the forefront of his concerns.  The image 
implied by the phrase summa divisio is that of a tree-like 
genus/species division, whose top level consists in mutually exclu-
sive and exhaustive classes.  Thus, the only reasonable interpre-
tation of G.3.88 is that the divisio drawn was meant to be both 
exhaustive and exclusive: when Gaius says that the summa divi-
sio of the causes of obligations is into contracts and delicts, he 
means that every possible obligation arises either from a contract 
or from a delict.  It cannot arise from something else or from both 
at the same time.11 
  This interpretation is conﬁrmed by the way Gaius used the 
phrase in the rest of the Institutes.  In G.1.9: Et quidem summa 
                                                                                               
Archivio Giuridico “Filippo Seraﬁni,” 93 (1925), 267, 285; R. Monier, 
Cours de Pandectes (Paris n.d. [1949]), 56 (citing Albertario and Arangio-
Ruiz); T. Mayer-Maly, “Divisio Obligationum,” Irish Jurist, 2 (1967), 375, 
379; P. Birks, “The Problem of Quasi-Delict,” Current Legal Problems, 22 
(1969), 164, 165; M. Kaser, “Divisio Obligationum,” in P. G. Stein and 
A. D. E. Lewis, eds., Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. 
Thomas (London 1983), 73, 82. 
10  T. Reinhardt, ed., Cicero’s Topica (Oxford 2002), 256–83, esp. 273, 
280; cf. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of 
the Civilian Tradition (Oxford 1996), 14.  The reference to Aristotle is 
Rhet. 2.23.9. 
11  Thanks to Professor Tobias Reinhardt for his help with the argu-
ment developed in this paragraph. 10  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 5
 
divisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut 
liberi sunt aut servi (“The summa divisio of the law of persons is 
this: all men are either free or slaves”),12 as well as in G.2.2: 
Summa itaque rerum divisio in duos articulos diducitur: nam 
aliae sunt divini iuris, aliae humani (“The summa divisio of 
things has two limbs: some things are under divine law, others 
under human law”),13 there is no doubt that the division was in-
deed meant to be complete.  It would take a very powerful argu-
ment to reverse the presumption of similar exhaustiveness when 
it comes to G.3.88. 
  To this, it is sometimes retorted that the Institutes were a 
beginners’ work, which was more interested in clarity of exposi-
tion than in comprehensiveness.  There is no doubt that the ﬁrst 
part of the statement is true; but there are two reasons which 
make it completely implausible to think that Gaius did not intend 
his summa divisio to be exhaustive.  First, if that was the case, he 
could have very easily avoided to say anything untrue without 
making the argument any more complicated, for example by say-
ing that “most obligations” arose from contract or delict, or that 
obligations “generally” arose from them.  Such an unspeciﬁc 
statement would not have forced him to venture into the miscel-
lany if he did not want to so as to keep his argument simple. 
  More importantly, the argument based on voluntary 
simpliﬁcation appears to be self-defeating.  Hardly had Gaius 
started his discussion of contracts that he drifted away to the dif-
ﬁcult case of the solutio indebiti.  His treatment of it is lengthy, 
complicated and so unclear that we are still wondering close to 
two thousand years later what exactly he meant by it.  If Gaius 
was concerned to any signiﬁcant degree with simplicity, he would 
logically have dispensed with a discussion of the solutio indebiti 
altogether.  Nothing forced him to deal with it; the Institutes have 
no ambition to be a comprehensive exposition of the law.  If he did 
engage in this lengthy and difficult discussion, it must be because 
he wanted to and felt he had to. 
  Here, we can without excessive presumption reconstruct 
Gaius’ chain of thoughts.  As he was writing about the mutuum, 
the obviously related case of the solutio came to his mind, and he 
saw that it seemed to challenge the validity of the statement he 
had just made two sentences earlier about the classiﬁcation of 
obligations.  But does it mean that he acknowledged that it was 
wrong?  Had this been the case, we would have expected him to 
                                                                                               
12  G.1.9 (Trans. Gordon and Robinson, revised). 
13  G.2.2 (Trans. Gordon and Robinson, revised). 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  11
 
explain that the reason why the obligation did not arise from con-
tract was because there was no deal; and because it did not arise 
from delict either, it had to arise from a third type of causative 
event.  At this point, he would in all likelihood have gone back to 
his earlier statement to qualify it along the lines suggested above; 
or alternatively he would have carved the miscellaneous category 
which only appeared, several decades later, in the Res cottidianae. 
  But he did neither.  Rather, he explained away the case of the 
solutio by pointing out that it did not aim at giving rise to a new 
obligation but at extinguishing an existing one.  The suggestion 
which is made here is that it is not a case of a creation of obliga-
tion at all, but rather of the discharge of an obligation.  It operates 
on a different level altogether.  Naturally this is wrong, for an 
obligation really is contracted; but the relevant question is what 
Gaius was attempting to do when he wrote about the “untying” of 
the bond.  In my mind, the only reading which makes sense of 
G.3.88–91 as a whole is that, far from acknowledging a flaw in his 
divisio, Gaius really meant to back it up by explaining that the 
solutio indebiti did not in fact contradict his summa divisio the 
way it might appear at ﬁrst sight.  This reading coheres with the 
wording of G.3.88, with the place where the solutio is examined 
(within contracts) and with the argument he gives for not re-
garding the solutio as a contractus (in effect, not that it lacks con-
ventio but that it aims to untie a deal).  It is also consistent with 
the fact that the divisio between contract and delict resurfaces 
three times in the fourth book of the Institutes, without any sug-
gestion that it might be incomplete.14  Everything suggests that 
Gaius must have meant, when he wrote it, that his summa divisio 
was a summa divisio: all obligations arise either from contract or 
from delict.15 
ii.  A Logical Difficulty 
There is, moreover, a logical problem with the traditional inter-
pretation in terms of addition of new categories.  The obligations 
which Gaius gave in his Res cottidianae as examples of obligations 
ex variis causarum ﬁguris did not come to life between the time he 
wrote his Institutes (ca. 135) and the later book (in the 170s); nor 
could have he been unaware of their existence at the time of the 
former.  Where then did he think that these obligations belonged 
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(Oxford 1951), 467; A. Biscardi, “Some Critical Remarks on the Roman 
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when he wrote his Institutes?  It is impossible to believe that he 
overlooked them altogether, be it simply because we know that he 
considered at least the case of the solutio indebiti.  But, had he 
thought that they did not ﬁt into his summa divisio, he would 
logically have carved the residuary class at that point or, again, 
toned down his statement in G.3.88.  The fact that he did not is 
another reason to believe that, in his mind, the division was in 
fact exhaustive and exclusive.16 
III.  An Alternative Explanation: Subtraction 
However, there is one way of solving the above difficulties, which 
is to abandon a postulate implicit to the analysis so far, namely, 
that the scope of the different categories remained static over 
time.  There is good reason to believe that it did not. 
A.  Description 
If we accept that Gaius meant his summa divisio to be exhaustive, 
the above difficulties can be solved, but we are faced in turn with 
a new one: how could G.3.88 and J.3.13.2 both be exhaustive 
summae divisiones of the law of obligations, when one comprises 
two categories and the other four? 
  Statically, this is an impossibility and at least one of them 
would have to be wrong.  Dynamically, however, if we take into 
account the time span between them, two possibilities to reconcile 
them emerge.  One is that the actions classiﬁed by Justinian as 
quasi-contractual or quasi-delictal came into existence between 
Gaius’ time and his.  It would then be possible for Gaius’ and 
Justinian’s classiﬁcations to be both exhaustive of obligations ex-
isting when they wrote.  However, we know that this is not the 
case, the obligations mentioned in J.3.27 and J.4.5 already exist-
ing by the time of Gaius’ Institutes. 
  In logic, the only other possibility is that the meaning of the 
categories shifted between Gaius and Justinian, and in particular 
that the original categories of contractus and delictum shrank, 
thereby effectively rendering shelterless obligations which were 
previously accommodated under their roof.  Based on what was 
said earlier about the content of the categories in Justinian’s 
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Certainly, in the Res cottidianae, they are treated as any other obligation; 
and even in the Institutes, Gaius did make signiﬁcant use of liability-
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time17 (and assuming the dividing line between lawful and unlaw-
ful events did not vary, which we have no reason to doubt), the 
one plausible explanation is that the factor distinguishing, in 
Justinian’s time, contractus and delictum from their quasi-
contractual and quasi-delictal appendices would have been “es-
sentialized.”  In other terms, conventio and culpa, which had 
clearly always been at least a typical characteristic of contract 
and delict, would have become an indispensable component of 
these legal categories: there could no longer exist a contractus 
without conventio or a delictum without culpa (in the wider sense, 
including dolus).  The quasi-categories would then have emerged 
from the gathering of conventio-less lawful events and culpa-less 
unlawful events, which would previously have been described re-
spectively as contractus and delicta. 
B.  Evidence 
The above argument was purely a priori, in that it set out a hy-
pothesis which logic dictates ought to be true if we accept that 
G.3.88, like J.3.13.2, means what it says and accurately reflects 
the law of its time: subject to the above speciﬁcations, if all obliga-
tions were either ex contractu or ex delicto at stage 1 (G.3.88) and 
either ex contractu or quasi ex contractu or ex delicto or quasi ex 
delicto at stage 2 (J.3.13.2), then the category “ex delicto” of stage 
1 must by construction square with those “ex delicto” and “quasi 
ex delicto” at stage 2 — and likewise on the contractual side.  In 
turn, this can only be explained by the fact that the scope of the 
categories ex contractu and ex delicto are narrower at stage 2 than 
stage 1. 
  Do we, however, have any factual evidence in the sources in 
support of this hypothesis?  The answer is that we do ﬁnd ample 
corroborative evidence on the lawful side of causative events (con-
tracts and “quasi-contracts”), but not on the unlawful side (delicts 
and “quasi-delicts”).  When it comes to the latter, the evidence is 
only circumstantial: it lies in the fact that the theory ﬁts the 
available data, and makes sense of the otherwise incomprehensi-
ble difficulties put forth above.  As will be seen,18 it is also sup-
ported by a similar contraction in the scope of liability under the 
lex Aquilia.  Along with the previous apodictic argument and the 
analogical argument from the narrowing down of contractus, this 
provides what is in my mind a strong case for the “shrinkage the-
ory.” 
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i.  The Narrowing Down of the Concept of Contract 
The theory that the scope of the concept of contractus narrowed 
down during the classical age of Roman law was ﬁrst articulated 
by Henry Vizioz in 1912 and can be summed up as follows.19  
“Contractus” was originally the Latin translation of Greek 
συνάλλαγµα, meaning dealings, transaction, negotium.  This in-
cluded all lawful, bilateral juridical (i.e. obligation-creating) acts, 
whether founded on the agreement of the parties or not.  How-
ever, at some stage in the development of Roman law, the 
meaning of the category came to shrink, from  συνάλλαγµα to 
what is expressed by the Latin word pactum in its wider sense, 
that is, a συνάλλαγµα founded on an agreement of the minds of 
the parties (conventio) — a meaning that, essentially, the word 
“contract” has kept till the present day.20 
  When and why this happened is not unequivocally clear.  As 
to timing, Vizioz suggested soon before the time of Gaius’ Insti-
tutes, because these still show traces of a struggle between the old 
and the new conception of contractus.  But more likely, no precise 
time can be pinpointed.  No one engineers the shifts in meaning 
that words occasionally experience; they just happen, and they 
happen gradually, some being quicker to embrace the new concep-
tion than others.  This must have been the case for contractus as 
well. 
  The evidence available (assuming no interpolation of the 
texts) ﬁts this theory well.  As early as Pedius, a lawyer who lived 
under the reign of Hadrian (AD 117–138), we ﬁnd the new mean-
                                                                                               
19  Vizioz (note 9), chapter 4, esp. 43–54.  Subsequently agreed with 
Vizioz: S. Perozzi, Istituzioni di diritto romano, 2, 2nd ed. (Rome 1928), § 
124; E. Albertario, Studi di diritto romano, 3 (Milan 1936), 77–81, 103; E. 
Betti, Istituzioni di diritto romano, 2, 2nd ed. (Padua 1947), 68 (describing 
the addition of the element of consensus in the notion of contractus as a 
“late evolution”); G. Grosso, Il sistema Romano dei contratti, 3rd ed. (Turin 
n.d. [1963]), 11; Biscardi (note 15), 373–75, 377–78.  Contra: S. Riccobono, 
Dal diritto Romano classico al diritto moderno (Palermo 1915), 290; W. W. 
Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law (Cambridge 1931), 
240 (although he does recognize that certain texts use “contractus” in a 
wider sense). 
20  One difficulty with the thesis is that it does not generally distin-
guish between the verb, contrahere, and the noun, contractus, whereas it 
is plain that the former is wider in scope than the latter: still today, in 
English, I can “contract” a disease without having signed a contract to 
that effect.  But the thesis still stands even if one sets aside the texts 
where only “contrahere,” to the exclusion of “contractus,” appears. 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  15
 
ing of contractus as pactum reported by Ulpian;21 on the other 
hand, Paul and Ulpian himself, in the early third century, still 
referred to the negotiorum gestio or the tutela, both to be later 
classiﬁed as “quasi-contracts” in Justinian’s Institutes, as contrac-
tus.22  This is evidence of the fact that a wider meaning of 
contractus, which did not entail conventio, existed at a time and 
then gradually disappeared from the legal landscape, albeit not in 
a uniform fashion. 
  Gaius falling in between the two, we can assume that his 
time was one of tension between contractus as συνάλλαγµα and 
contractus as pactum.  (This would indeed make perfect sense of 
                                                                                               
21  D.2.14.1.3 (Ulpian 4 ed.): Adeo autem conventionis nomen generale 
est, ut eleganter dicat Pedius nullum esse contractum, nullam obligatio-
nem, quae non habeat in se conventionem . . . .  (“Moreover, so true is it 
that the word ‘agreement’ has a general signiﬁcance that Pedius neatly 
says that there is no contract, no obligation which does not consist of 
agreement . . . .”  Trans. Watson Digest.) 
22 For  negotiorum gestio, see D.3.5.15(16) (Paul 7 Plaut.): Sed et cum 
aliquis negotia mea gerat, non multa negotia sunt, sed unus contractus, 
nisi si ab initio ad unum negotium accessit, ut ﬁnito eo discederet: hoc 
enim casu si nova voluntate aliud quoque adgredi coeperit, alius contrac-
tus est.  (“Again, when someone transacts business of mine, it is not a 
number of transactions but a single contract, unless initially he took on 
only one transaction with the intention of getting out on its completion.  
For in this case, if he makes a fresh decision to tackle another as well, it is 
a different contract.”  Trans. Watson Digest, revised.)  For tutela, see 
D.13.5.1.6 (Ulpian 27 ed.):  Debitum autem ex quacumque causa potest 
constitui, id est ex quocumque contractu sive certi sive incerti, et si ex causa 
emptionis quis pretium debeat vel ex causa dotis vel ex causa tutelae vel ex 
quocumque alio contractu.  (“A constitutum can be made in respect of a 
debt arising from any cause, that is, from any contract of ﬁxed or unﬁxed 
content, or a debt in respect of a price under a sale, or else on the basis of 
dowry or of a tutelage or any other contract whatever.”  Trans. Watson 
Digest) and D.44.7.49 (Paul 18 Plaut.): Ex contractibus venientes actiones 
in heredes dantur, licet delictum quoque versetur, veluti cum tutor in tutela 
gerenda dolo fecerit aut is apud quem depositum est: quo casu etiam cum 
ﬁlius familias aut servus quid tale commisit, de peculio actio datur, non 
noxalis.  (“Actions arising from contracts are available against the heirs, 
even if a wrong is also involved, for example, if a tutor in the admini-
stration of his tutelage, or a person with whom property has been deposit-
ed, acted fraudulently; in such a case even when a son-in-power or a slave 
has committed a wrong of this kind, an action on the peculium, and not a 
noxal action, is allowed.”  Trans. Watson Digest.)  For both negotiorum 
gestio and tutela, see D.50.17.23 (Ulpian 29 Sab.):  Contractus quidam 
dolum malum dumtaxat recipiunt, quidam et dolum et culpam. . . .  Dolum 
et culpam mandatum, commodatum, venditum, pignori acceptum, loca-
tum, item dotis datio, tutelae, negotia gesta.  (“Some contracts involve bad 
faith, some also culpability. . . .  Mandate, loan for use, sale, acceptance in 
pledge, hire, likewise grant of a dowry, grant of tutelage, unauthorized 
administration involve bad faith and culpability.”  Trans. Watson Digest.) 16  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 5
 
the evolution in his works, the Institutes reflecting the older 
approach and the Res cottidianae the newer).  Vizioz pointed out 
that the Institutes show this tension between the wider and 
narrower senses of the term.  There, Gaius was tempted to deal 
with  solutio indebiti as a contract, as evidenced by the place 
where he deals with it.  As was seen, he renounced — not because 
of the absence of consent but because, he said, the operation 
aimed at distrahere and not at contrahere; however, the place 
where it is discussed is highly signiﬁcant: it is G.3.91, just after 
mutuum, i.e. within contracts.  His starting point must have been 
that the solutio indebiti was a contract, which presumably was 
still the dominant opinion of his time.  Gaius’ unease regarding 
non-consensual contracts is plainly visible in this passage: on the 
one hand, he could not bring himself to classify the solutio as a 
contractus; on the other, he would not write, like his contempor-
ary Pedius, that contractus entails conventio, which was lacking 
in the case of the solutio.  As a result, he was forced to explain 
away the case of the mistaken payment through a different (and 
unconvincing) means.23 
  This unease might also explain why Gaius makes no mention 
at all in his Institutes of the other obligations which he would lat-
er classify as quasi ex contractu or quasi ex delicto.  Most likely, 
he simply did not know what to make of them, sensing that he 
could not properly include them under the headings of “contracts” 
or “delicts,” yet not having taken the decisive step of creating an-
other category to accommodate them.  In contrast, by the time of 
the  Res cottidianae, he had bridged the gap to the newer (and 
narrower) meaning of contractus as pactum, which was reflected 
in his categorization of solutio indebiti,  negotiorum gestio, and 
others as quasi ex contractu.24 
  It is not my concern here to venture possible explanations for 
this shrinkage.  Its historicity is well grounded in the texts, and 
what matters for the present purpose is only its consequences on 
the classiﬁcation of obligations.  The principal consequence is 
that, while those actions formerly described as ex contractu but 
where no agreement could be found did not disappear from the 
legal landscape, they could no longer be called contractual.  They 
were, in effect, quasi-contractual: they produced the very same 
                                                                                               
23  Above at 11. 
24 It is also interesting to compare G.4.182, where there does not 
seem to be a way around the conclusion that Gaius is implicitly calling 
tutelage a contractus, with D.44.7.5.1 (from the third book of Gaius’ Res 
cottidianae), where it is explicitly referred to as a cause of obligation quasi 
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effects as contractual obligations (a feature of which this inter-
pretation makes complete sense, since this is what they would 
originally have been); but they did not arise from contract in the 
narrower sense.  They arose as if there had been a contract-
pactum,  quasi ex contractu — hence both the category and its 
name. 
ii.  The Narrowing Down of the Concept of Delict 
As was mentioned, there is no similar textual evidence of shrink-
age on the side of unlawful causative events: we do not possess 
earlier texts where an obligation was described as ex delicto and 
later texts where it is categorized as quasi ex delicto.  The 
evidence is circumstantial only.  What can be done in this section, 
however, is provide an illustration of a similar phenomenon of 
contraction, and a tentative explanation of why such a shrinkage 
would have occurred. 
The parallel with the lex Aquilia 
While there is no direct evidence of the shrinkage of the concept of 
delictum in Roman law, there is such evidence of the narrowing 
down of the grounds of liability within the delictal class in respect 
of the wrong of damnum iniuria datum (loss wrongfully caused 
under the provisions of the lex Aquilia and the related actiones 
utiles).  This is signiﬁcant because it constitutes an illustration of 
the rise of culpa as a condition of liability in delict, which entails 
in logic the creation of the quasi-delictal appendix.25  F o r  t h i s  
reason, it constitutes strong indirect evidence for the present hy-
pothesis. 
  Even if our knowledge of the words of the action is imperfect, 
it is not doubted that the wording of the lex Aquilia made no 
reference to fault.  Liability attached, at least on the face of it, to 
the occurrence of certain events: it was situational.  However, 
these events were not deﬁned randomly; by their very nature they 
normally resulted from intentional misconduct.  It is equally 
certain that by the time of Gaius, at the latest, liability under the 
lex Aquilia had been restricted to culpable conduct in the wider 
sense: as he writes in his Institutes, “a person kills wrongfully 
when the death happens by his malicious intent or by his fault . . . 
and so no liability is imposed on someone who inflicts loss without 
                                                                                               
25 Or else the re-categorization of cases of strict liability as being 
based on lawful events.  This avenue was not followed by the Romans, but 
would be by some lawyers of the ius commune, in particular Molina (see 
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either fault or malicious intent, but by some accident.”26  This is a 
perfect illustration of what is suggested in this article was a 
general transformation of delictal liability, from situational to 
culpa-based. 
  Again, in the face of the lack of evidence, how this trans-
formation occurred is bound to be largely a matter of speculation.  
Professor Ibbetson has suggested that it was brought about by the 
need to decide to whom responsibility should be affixed in the case 
of a plurality of causal agents: it would be to him who was to be 
blamed, who had acted culpa.27  However, this does not explain 
why it became a general principle of liability under the lex 
Aquilia, even in the case of a single potential defendant.  As is 
apparent from Gaius’ statement, couched in the most general 
terms, the requirement of culpa c a m e  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  
integral part of Aquilian liability.  Because this was not included 
in the original words, the most obvious explanation is to surmise 
that the odd innocent defendant, feeling naturally (as we would) 
that an injustice was being done to him, pleaded casus, the acci-
dental occurrence of the loss, as a defence.28  Gaius’ text evidences 
that such defendants were consistently successful, to the point 
where it was accepted by all that no liability under the lex would 
attach to accidental wrongdoing.  By subtracting casus, lawyers 
had effectively (if indirectly) reduced Aquilian liability to liability 
for fault-culpa. 
Poena and culpa 
If we accept that the concept of a delict shrank, in classical Ro-
man law, from an unlawful civil act to a blameworthy such act 
(containing either dolus or culpa on the defendant’s part), the 
next question becomes why such a shift would have occurred. 
  It is always dangerous to speculate as to the causes of events 
historically so remote, especially when few hard facts are avail-
able.  However, in the present case, common sense does suggest 
an easy explanation, which can be offered tentatively.  The argu-
ment has to do with the characteristics of early systems of civil 
                                                                                               
26  G.3.211 (Trans. Gordon and Robinson). 
27 D. Ibbetson, “How the Romans did for Us: Ancient Roots of the 
Tort of Negligence,” U. New S. Wales L.J., 26 (2003), 475, 495–97. 
28  As long as liability under the lex Aquilia was limited to the direct 
causation of harm, the problem would have remained unimportant in 
practice.  A directly inflicted injury is typically intentional.  It is when the 
praetor started to extend liability on an analogical basis to indirectly 
caused loss that issues of blameworthiness (intertwined with questions of 
causation) would have come to the fore. 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  19
 
liability as result-oriented, and with the penal character of the 
Roman law of civil wrongs.  Kaser has convincingly shown that 
earlier liability was what he called “typiﬁed liability for fault” (in 
fact, for intentional fault): 
In the earliest period, all peoples took into account the exter-
nally visible event, the act, and imputed the act to any 
wrongdoer who had caused the result.  However, probably 
everywhere and from early times, this was based on the 
experience that somebody who committed typical acts result-
ing in a loss, mostly intended also to inflict loss; the ancient 
strict liability, therefore, in reality was a typiﬁed liability for 
fault.29 
What was penalized was the loss caused, but the redressable loss 
was deﬁned in such a way as to normally entail intention to harm.  
This is intuitive. 
  But equally intuitive is the fact that the issue of intent was 
bound to come up at a later stage.  A slave has his throat cut: this 
is paradigmatically the result of a wicked, intentional assault.  It 
is plainly wrong, and will be penalized by the law.  Liability, at 
least on the face of it, will be for slaying the slave.  It will attach 
to the occurrence of a particular event.  But sometimes the 
situation will not be so simple.  The slave might have attacked the 
killer.  That the defendant would escape liability if he had acted 
in self-defence is, again, quite plain in regard of common morality.  
Rationalized by lawyers, this will lead to the speciﬁcation that the 
killing must have been done without justiﬁcation,  iniuria; and 
self-defence provides (under circumstances to be reﬁned by the 
law) such a right to kill.  The slave was killed deliberately, but 
justiﬁably rather than wickedly.  Then again, he might not have 
been killed intentionally.  He might, in some cases which common 
sense suggests must be rare, have been killed accidentally and in 
others, which in a quasi-autarkical society must have been incom-
parably less frequent than today, negligently so.  Should the doer 
of the act escape liability in these cases? 
  An untutored perception suggests that the answer depends on 
what goal or goals are ascribed to the imposition of liability.  If 
the goal is to punish, the answer seems to be yes, “it being useless 
to apply a sanction where the will is passive,” as John Austin 
phrased it in the nineteenth century.30  As a matter of fact, Pro-
                                                                                               
29 M. Kaser, Roman Private Law, trans. R. Dannenbring, 3rd ed. 
(Pretoria 1980), 186. 
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fessor Ibbetson has documented how criminal responsibility 
crystallized historically out of legal provisions dependent on the 
voluntariness of the act (as distinct from civil liability, concerned 
with the comparison with an external standard of conduct).31  
This makes complete sense.  Indeed, even though the more recent 
history of criminal law has made some inroads into this principle, 
it is plain that intentional conduct is still of the essence of crime.  
If, on the other hand, the objective is to compensate the victim for 
the harm suffered, the answer becomes much less clear.  There is 
on the one hand someone who caused harm without meaning to 
and on the other hand a (normally innocent) victim who suffered 
damage.  Where should the loss lie?  It is at least a possibility to 
hold that the causal agent has to bear it.  (This is of course all the 
easier to hold if he is to blame in a milder sense, not that he 
meant to cause the loss but that he could have avoided the result 
had he been diligent.) 
  Legal systems do not normally make explicit what the goals 
of their liability in wrongs are; but this can largely be recon-
structed from the rules they apply, be it the deﬁnition of wrongful 
events or the legal consequences attached to them.  In systems 
which do not distinguish between criminal and civil wrongs, the 
one class of wrongs is bound to be the vehicle for punishment, 
compensation, and other possible aims, all at one time.  In sys-
tems which do distinguish between them (as later Roman law 
did), history shows that less emphasis will be put in the case of 
civil wrongs on punishment and more on compensation.  Again, 
this is commonsensical. 
  In modern legal systems, it has been a temptation to claim 
that civil wrongs were exclusively about compensation, punish-
ment being the realm of criminal law.  In the Roman law of 
delicts, on the other hand, the punitive component is not only 
plainly visible, but prominent: even though considerations of com-
pensation are also present, it is transparent that the main 
emphasis is on the punishment of the wrongdoer through the 
infliction of the poena (penalty).  The Roman law of wrongs can 
therefore be adequately described as a penal law.32  Actions, both 
delictal and quasi-delictal,33 were penal (either exclusively or in 
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Legal Hist., 25 (2004), 99. 
32  Schulz (note 15), 573; M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, 1, 2nd 
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part).  They had, in Kaser’s word, the purpose to make the wrong-
doer “expiate” his act.34 
  This, in itself, does not entail that liability in wrongs will be 
dependent on culpa in the wider sense.  But it makes it logical: in 
reason, there can be liability without fault, but there cannot be 
poena without culpa; if that happens to be the case because of the 
way the system developed historically, it must be regarded as 
anomalous and kept to its fringes, for instance in a “quasi-
wrongful” class.  Punishment naturally brings about the require-
ment of fault.  Imperfect as the equivalence might be at any given 
time, there is an evident connection between poena and culpa: the 
farther one goes in the direction of punishment, the more 
emphasis will be put on wicked intent; conversely, the more em-
phasis is put on compensation, the less important it will naturally 
become.  This does not mean that the Roman law of civil wrongs 
was bound to settle on culpa as its minimal requirement for 
liability in delict.  It could have been otherwise (for example, liabi-
lity could have been made dependent on dolus malus, as indeed it 
was in three of the four institutional wrongs).35  But it does make 
it completely intelligible that this is what it did, and especially 
that it excluded accidents from the scope of liability in wrongs 
“proper.”  Instances of strict liability cannot be reconciled in a 
principled manner with the infliction of a penalty upon the 
wrongdoer.  Thus, apart from the circumstantial historical evi-
dence, the thesis defended in this paper appears to be intrinsically 
plausible. 
Conclusion 
This article, building on the assumption that quasi-delictal 
liability corresponded in Roman law to situational liability, has 
attempted to provide a rationale for the distinction between two 
classes of wrongs, delicts and “quasi-delicts.”  Starting from the 
observation that the division did not always exist in the institu-
tional taxonomy of the law, Gaius having really meant his summa 
divisio in G.3.88 to be a summa divisio, it hypothesized that the 
emergence of the quasi-delictal appendix was brought about by a 
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contraction of the meaning of delictum, from an unlawful civil act 
to a culpable (i.e. blameworthy) such act.  This contraction was 
mirrored on the lawful side of causative events by that of contrac-
tus, from συνάλλαγµα to pactum.  While the latter shift is docu-
mented in the sources, the forme r  i s  n o t .   T h e  a r g u m e n t  i s  a 
priori; but it is supported by signiﬁcant circumstantial evidence, 
starting with the fact that it makes sense of the twin 
classiﬁcations of obligations in G.3.88 and J.3.13.2 in a way other 
theories do not. 
  If the “shrinkage hypothesis” is true, it has interesting reper-
cussions for the modern law, and in particular for the jurispru-
dential analysis of the concept of a civil wrong.  By and large, 
modern law accepts that the law of wrongs is made of two strands, 
fault-based liability and liability irrespective of fault.36  Certainly, 
the common law has never had any difficulty with the proposition 
that the duty of which a wrong is the breach can be a strict duty 
just as much as a duty of care.37  The civilian tradition, on the 
other hand, has exhibited greater hesitation.  While a system like 
French law would accept nowadays the existence of strict as well 
as fault-based liability within its law of civil wrongs, historically it 
has attempted more than once to reduce both tracks to one, either 
by denying the factual existence of wrongs not based on culpa or, 
more recently, by widening the concept of fault from historical 
culpa to something akin to a breach of duty, regardless of the 
content of the duty.38  Still today, some civilian voices can be 
heard suggesting that a wrong is necessarily, or at least appro-
priately, the breach of a duty of careful behavior.39  Instances of 
what we would otherwise call strict liability (typically based on 
the taking of a special risk) would then ﬁnd themselves rejected 
outside the law of wrongs altogether, and transferred to the 
lawful side of causative events.  On this view, “strict liability” is 
based on the implicit promise to pay compensation if the danger-
ous action happens to injure others: taking a risk is lawful, but 
                                                                                               
36 E.g. Zimmermann (note 10), 22; J. Esser, “Die Zweispurigkeit 
unseres Haftpflichtrechts,” Juristenzeitung, 8 (1953), 129. 
37 A. Burrows, ed., English Private Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2007), 
§ 17.18 n.  For an analysis of wrong as a breach of duty, see generally P. 
Birks, “The Concept of a Civil Wrong,” in D. G. Owen, ed., Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford 1995), 31, 33, 37. 
38  Descheemaeker (note 2), chapters 5–6. 
39  E.g. N. Jansen, “Duties and Rights in Negligence: A Comparative 
and Historical Perspective on the European Law of Extracontractual 
Liability,” Oxford J. Legal Stud., 24 (2004), 443, 446. 2009  The Roman Division of Wrongs  23
 
taking it without accepting responsibility for the consequences is 
not. 
  Is a wrong the breach of a duty simpliciter or the breach of a 
duty of careful behavior?  In this debate, Gaius appears to have 
steered a unique middle course which, in my mind, can be re-
garded as the root of modern hesitancies about the concept of a 
civil wrong.  If the hypothesis developed in this paper is correct, 
between the time of the Institutes and that of the Res cottidianae, 
Gaius accepted that a wrong could only properly be called a wrong 
if it contained an element of blameworthiness (culpa or dolus).  
However, he did not eliminate instances of unculpable liability-
creating events from the legal landscape, nor did he re-categorize 
them, as Molina later would,40 as lawful events.  Rather, he 
consigned them to an unlawful but non-wrongful limbo, thereby 
driving a wedge between the two notions.  In Gaius’ sense, wrong-
fulness is narrower than unlawfulness: an event can be prohibited 
by the legal system and attract civil liability, even though it is not 
blameworthy and cannot therefore be called a delict. 
  It is not clear how this proposition can be defended on its 
merits; arguably, strict liability should either be recognized as 
part and parcel of the law of wrongs (if possibly a special subpart 
of it, which is a separate issue), or eliminated altogether.  Be that 
as it may, we can recognize Gaius’ taxonomical choice as the ori-
gin of the modern tension between the two notions.  The uneasy 
area of unlawfulness without wrongfulness, which was labelled 
“quasi-wrongful” by Gaius, continues to be a cause of trouble for 
us today; and modern lawyers are still not in agreement as to how 
we should understand it.  This is another example of the way in 
which our thinking about the law is constrained by the choices 
that others made for us long before our legal systems even 
existed. 
 
 
                                                                                               
40  Luis de Molina, De justitia et jure, 3 (Mainz 1659), 154 (= Tract. II, 
Disp. 698, n. 3): the obligation to pay compensation arises “non quidem 
ratione culpae theologicae, sed ratione pacti, seu quasi pacti.” 